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Summary 
 
This paper evaluates the competing theories that seek to explain the greater magnitude of 
undeclared work in some nations than others. These theories variously explain the higher levels 
of undeclared work in some nations to be determined by either economic under-development 
and the lack of modern governance (³modernisation´ theory), higher taxes and state over-
interference (³neo-liberal´ theory) or inadequate government intervention in work and welfare 
(³political economy´ theory). Reporting data on the magnitude of undeclared work in the 28 
member states of the European Union using the labour input method, the finding is that 
undeclared work is higher in EU member states with lower levels of GDP per capita, less 
modernised systems of government, higher levels of corruption, social transfers are less 
effective at reducing poverty, and there are lower levels of public expenditure on labour market 
interventions to protect vulnerable groups. The theoretical and policy implications are then 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It is now recognised that undeclared work, although prevalent in all European Union (EU) 
member states, significantly varies in its magnitude across countries (Dotti et al., 2015; Medina 
and Schneider, 2017; Williams, 2014b; Williams and Schneider, 2016). This means that the 
impacts of undeclared work are greater in some EU member states than others. Undeclared 
workers find themselves having to accept poorer working conditions, lower wages, 
infringements of their labour rights and reduced protection under labour and social protection 
law, thus depriving themselves of adequate social benefits, pension rights and access to 
healthcare, as well as skills development and lifelong learning opportunities (European 
Commission, 2016; ILO, 2015). The prevalence of these vulnerable undeclared workers, 
however, varies across the EU member states. So too does the extent of unfair competition felt 
by businesses operating legitimately vary across countries, as does the level of reduced tax and 
social security revenues vary significantly between member states (European Commission, 
2016; Williams, 2014, 2018).  
How, therefore, can these cross-country variations be explained? And what does this 
teach us about how undeclared work should be tackled? In recent years, the issue of explaining 
and tackling undeclared work has been high on the political agenda in the EU, exemplified by 
the European Commission establishing the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work 
(European Commission, 2016). Until now, however, relatively few attempts have been made 
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to evaluate the competing theories that variously explain the variations in the magnitude of 
undeclared work across countries. This paper seeks to fill that gap. 
Therefeore, the aim of this paper is to advance understanding of the determinants of 
undeclared work by evaluating three competing theories for the greater magnitude of 
undeclared work in some nations rather than others. These variously explain undeclared work 
as resulting from either economic under-development and the lack of modern governance 
(³modernisation´ theory), higher taxes and too much state intervention (³neo-liberal´ theory) 
or inadequate government intervention in work and welfare provision (³political economy´ 
theory).   
To advance understanding, the first section briefly reviews how undeclared work can 
be measured, and how the cross-country variations in the prevalence of undeclared work have 
been variously explained from the perspectives of modernisation, neo-liberal and political 
economy theory. Revealing that the only attempts so far to evaluate these contrasting 
explanations have used a limited range of measurement methods and datasets, this paper 
introduces a new dataset and measurement method. The second section then introduces the 
Labour Input Method (LIM) here used to measure the cross-country variations in the 
prevalence of undeclared work across the European Union, along with the indicators used to 
evaluate the validity of the contrasting theories. The third section reports the results on the 
cross-national variations in the magnitude of undeclared work and the validity of the 
contrasting theories using bivariate regressions, followed in the fourth and final section by a 
discussion of the implications for theory and policy, and future research required. 
At the outset, however, undeclared work needs to be defined. Undeclared work has 
been variously denoted using some 45 different nouns and 10 adjectives, including the ³cash-
in-hand´, ³shadow´, ³informal´, ³black´ and ³underground´ economy/sector/work (Williams, 
2004). Despite this, a strong consensus exists in both the scholarly and policy-making 
communities in terms of how this economic activity can be defined. The view is that what is 
here termed ³undeclared work´ can be defined by what is absent from, or insufficient about, it 
compared with declared work, and the consensus is that the only absence from, or insufficiency 
about, undeclared work is that this paid work is not declared to the authorities for tax, social 
security and/or labour law purposes when it should be declared (European Commission, 1998, 
2007, 2016; OECD, 2002; Williams, 2004, 2017; Williams and Windebank, 1998). If paid 
work possesses other absences or insufficiencies, then it is not undeclared work. For example, 
if the goods and/or services exchanged are illegal (such as illegal drugs), then this is not 
undeclared work but part of the wider criminal economy. If it is unpaid, meanwhile, it is not 
undeclared work but part of the unpaid sphere. 
 
 
2. Measuring and explaining undeclared work: a review 
 
Measuring the magnitude of undeclared work 
By definition, undeclared work is not declared to the authorities. Therefore, measuring its size 
is difficult. Examining the cross-national variations in the magnitude of undeclared work is 
even more problematic because harmonised definitions and survey methods are rare. Despite 
these problems, there have been in recent decades various attempts to measure the national and 
cross-national variations in the magnitude of undeclared work. Two methods have been used, 
namely indirect survey methods which use either proxy indicators of the magnitude of 
undeclared work or seek statistical traces of the magnitude of undeclared work in 
macroeconomic data collected for other purposes (Williams and Schneider, 2016), and direct 
surveys (OECD, 2002, 2012; Ram and Williams, 2008; Williams, 2004).  
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Indirect methods involve four main techniques: the use of individual non-monetary 
proxy indicators such as the number of very small enterprises (ILO, 2002) or electricity demand 
(e.g., Friedman et al., 2000; Lacko, 1999); the use of individual monetary proxy indicators such 
as the level of cash deposits (Gutmann, 1977) or money transactions (Feige, 2012;  Frey and 
Weck, 1983), the use of discrepancies such as income/expenditure discrepancies at either the 
aggregate or individual level (Paglin ,1994) or labour inputs according to different surveys 
(Williams et al., 2017), and the use of multiple proxy indicators (e.g., Schneider, 2013; 
Schneider and Williams, 2013).  
Direct surveys, meanwhile, interview respondents about their participation in 
undeclared work. Cross-country surveys include a three-country comparison of some European 
countries (Pedersen, 2003), a 2007 and 2013 special Eurobarometer survey of undeclared work 
across the European Union (Williams, 2013; Williams and Windebank, 2015), a study of earlier 
International Labour Organization (ILO) data of informal employment in 41 less developed 
economies (Williams, 2015a) and employment in the informal economy in 36 countries 
(Williams, 2015b). These tend to under-estimate its magnitude due to participants being 
unwilling to report illegitimate activity in interviews.  
The consensus in the scholarly and practitioner literature is to use indirect methods, 
using macroeconomic data collected and/or constructed for other purposes, to measure the 
magnitude of undeclared work. Meanwhile, direct survey methods are advocated to identify its 
characteristics in terms of who engages in undeclared work, what they do and why, so as to 
inform policy development (Eurofound, 2013; European Commission, 2007; Williams and 
Schneider, 2016).  
Until now, the main indirect method used to evaluate the magnitude of undeclared work 
has been the multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) method (Schneider and Williams, 
2013). The problem, however, is that many of the indicators assumed in this method to be 
causes of undeclared work (e.g., high social expenditure, high taxes) have been questioned in 
recent years and the direction of the association found to be the opposite of what is suggested 
in this MIMIC method (see for example, Williams, 2013).  
Here, therefore, an alternative indirect measurement method, namely the LIM, will be 
used to measure the size of the undeclared economy (OECD, 2002). The LIM uses 
macroeconomic data to measure, for each member state, the discrepancy between the reported 
supply of labour inputs by workers (from the Labour Force Survey) and demand side data on 
recorded labour use from employers (e.g. from enterprise surveys, company declarations to tax 
or social security authorities, or national statistical offices). The discrepancy between the two 
provides an estimate of magnitude of undeclared work. This method will be described in greater 
detail below in the methodology section.   
 
Explaining cross-national variations in undeclared work 
 
Reviewing the scholarship explaining the variable magnitude of undeclared work across 
nations, it becomes quickly apparent that this has been variously theorised as resulting from 
either economic under-development and a lack of modernisation of governance (modernisation 
theory), state over-interference in the free market (neo-liberal theory) or inadequate state 
intervention in work and welfare (political economy theory). Each theory is here considered in 
turn. 
During the twentieth century, undeclared work was predominantly viewed as a leftover 
from a pre-modern mode of production that was disappearing. Consequently, little attention 
was paid to the undeclared economy since it was perceived as a residue and dwindling. 
Economies in which undeclared work still prevailed were termed ³XQGHU-GHYHORSHG´DQGHYHQ
³EDFNZDUG´FRPSDUHGZLWKeconomies in which the modern formal economy dominated, which 
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were viHZHGDV³DGYDQFHG´DQG³GHYHORSHG´*HHUW], 1963; Gilbert, 1998; Lewis, 1959). From 
this modernisation perspective, in consequence, undeclared work is more prevalent in less 
developed economies with a lack of modern governance, and the consequent solution is to 
focus upon promoting economic development and the modernisation of government, such as 
by tackling public sector corruption. In this modernisation theory, in consequence, corruption 
and undeclared work are seen as complements; increased corruption, which acts like an 
additional tax increasing the regulatory burden, leads to higher levels of undeclared work 
(Buehn and Schneider, 2012; Dreher and Schneider, 2010; Goel and Saunoris, 2014; Hibbs and 
Piculescu, 2005; Wallace and Latcheva, 2006). To test the validity of modernisation theory, 
therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Modernisation hypothesis (H1): undeclared work is more prevalent in countries with: 
(H1a) less developed economies and (H1b) less modern governance. 
 
The recent realisation that undeclared work remains extensive (ILO, 2018; Schneider and 
Williams, 2013) and a persistent feature of all economies, even in countries witnessing 
economic development and modernisation (Williams and Schneider, 2016), has led to the 
emergence of new theorisations. For neo-liberal theory, when there is state over-interference 
in the economy and welfare, participation in undeclared work is a rational economic strategy 
voluntarily pursued by workers and enterprises to escape the declared economy due to the 
excessive costs, time and effort required to operate in the declared sphere (e.g., Becker, 2004; 
London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Sauvy, 1984). For these neo-liberal scholars, 
undeclared work is rational economic decision for workers and enterprises facing high taxes 
and over-regulation (De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007). The magnitude of 
undeclared work is therefore viewed as higher in countries with higher taxes and greater levels 
of state interference and the consequent solution is to reduce taxes, de-regulate the economy 
and reduce state support for welfare provision. For neo-liberal commentators (Loayza, 2007; 
Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004; Schneider et al.2010), therefore, 
the main causes of undeclared work are high tax and social security contribution burdens 
(Cebula, 1997; Feld and Schneider, 2010; Friedman et al., 2000; Giles, 1999; Giles and Tedds, 
2002; Hill and Kabir, 1996; Johnson et al., 1998; Schneider, 2005; Tanzi, 1999). To test the 
validity of this neo-liberal theory, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Neo-liberal hypothesis (H2): undeclared work is more prevalent in countries with: 
(H2a) higher tax rates and (H2b) higher levels of state interference in the free market. 
 
The inverse of this is argued by political economy scholars. Undeclared work is asserted to 
directly result from the advent of a de-regulated open global economy (Castells and Portes, 
1989; Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; Hudson, 2005; Slavnic, 2010), and outsourcing and 
subcontracting are key means by which undeclared work has become integrated into 
contemporary capitalism. Contrary to modernisation theory, ³the informal economy is far from 
a vestige of earlier stages in economic development. Instead, informality is part and parcel of 
the processes of modernization´ (Fernandez-Kelly 2006: 18). Therefore, this is a largely 
unregulated sphere involving low-paid insecure work conducted under ³sweatshop-like´ 
conditions as a survival tactic by marginalised populations (Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 
2006; Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2002). From this political economy perspective, undeclared work is 
a result of low state intervention in the economy and welfare, and the lack of protection of 
workers. As such, undeclared work is higher when taxes are lower, public expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP is lower, and there are lower levels of social protection. To test the validity 
of this political economy theory, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
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Political economy hypothesis (H3): undeclared work is more prevalent in countries with 
lower levels of state intervention in work and welfare. 
 
 
 
Evaluations of the competing explanations 
Until now, the cross-national variations in the magnitude of undeclared work have been 
predominantly explained using one of the above three ³logics´. In a small minority of studies, 
nevertheless, it has been argued that different theories apply to different populations or 
activities, such as political economy explanations to undeclared waged employment and neo-
liberal explanations to undeclared self-employment (Perry and Maloney, 2007; Williams et al., 
2013), or political economy explanations to relatively deprived populations and neo-liberal 
explanations to relatively affluent populations (Evans et al., 2006; Pfau-Effinger, 2009; 
Williams, 2004). 
Until now, however, there have been only a few evidence-based evaluations of the 
validity of these competing theories when explaining cross-national variations in the magnitude 
of undeclared work. The exceptions are two studies using the 2007 and 2013 special 
Eurobarometer survey of the member states of the European Union (Williams, 2013; Williams 
and Windebank, 2015), and studies of earlier ILO data on informal employment in 41 less 
developed economies (Williams, 2015a) and employment in the informal economy in 36 
developing countries (Williams, 2015b). All find evidence to support the tenets of both the 
modernisation and political economy theories but little evidence to support neo-liberal theory. 
All these studies, however, are based on data from direct survey methods. No indirect 
measurement methods have been used to evaluate these competing theories. This is because 
the main indirect measurement method used, namely the MIMIC method, is based on the neo-
liberal assumptions that high tax and social security burdens lead to an increased prevalence of 
undeclared work. Here, therefore, an alternative indirect measurement of undeclared work is 
used to test these competing explanations which makes no such assumptions from the outset 
and enables the validity of these findings to be tested using an alternative source of data and 
different measure of undeclared work.  
 
3. Data and methods 
 
The Labour Input Method (LIM) is an indirect measurement of the magnitude of undeclared 
work. It examines the discrepancy between the reported labour supply by workers (from the 
Labour Force Survey) and the reported use of labour by employers (e.g. from enterprise 
surveys, company declarations to tax or social security authorities, or national statistical 
offices). This discrepancy provides an estimate of the magnitude of undeclared work. The 
underpinning assumption is that businesses deliberately hide some of their labour input, and 
that by identifying the discrepancies in the labour inputs reported by businesses in enterprise 
surveys, and the labour inputs reported by workers in labour force surveys, an estimate of the 
magnitude of undeclared work can be achieved. Therefore, the LIM has four stages (OECD, 
2002):  
x Estimate the labour input from the demand-side using enterprise surveys; 
x Estimate the labour input from the supply-side using a labour force survey (LFS) 
supplemented by population registers or census data if these are available; 
x Standardise these estimates using the same units of labour input, such as hours in 
employment or full-time equivalent workers; 
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x Compare the two estimates and evaluate potential discrepancies taking account of the 
reliability of the different sources.  
 
The OECD (2002) suggests a process for converting these discrepancies in labour inputs into 
an estimate of this as a percentage of gross value added (GVA). It states that analysts should: 
1) Produce labour supply estimates disaggregated at the level of economic activity and size of 
enterprise or type of labour (employees, self-employed), from a labour force survey and/or 
other supplementary demographic source;  
2) Produce estimates of output per unit of labour input and value added per unit of labour 
input for the same activity and size breakdown from regular statistical enterprise surveys; 
and  
3) Multiply the labour input estimates from (1) using ratios expressed in the per unit terms 
which results in output and value added for the activity and size categories.  
The labour inputs estimated in stage 1 are used as weights that should be applied to the 
enterprise survey output estimates and value added per unit of labour input (derived in stage 
2). To calculate the undeclared work component of the GVA, ratios of output and value added 
per unit of labour input are used, taken from enterprise surveys (SBS).  
Therefore, the discrepancy in labour inputs from the supply- and demand-side are here 
reported for each EU member state for the year 2013 (for a detailed analysis, see Williams et 
al., 2018). The demand-side labour inputs are calculated using the national accounts (NAs) 
while the supply-side inputs are calculated using the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). 
Given that the structural business statistics (SBS) cover only the private sector, the estimate of 
the magnitude of undeclared work is limited to the share of labour inputs in the private sector 
that is undeclared work.  
To evaluate the various theorisations for the higher levels of undeclared work in some 
nations, macro-level indicators are used. To test the modernisation theory that the level of 
economic development is an important determinant of cross-national variations in the 
magnitude of undeclared work (using the LIM estimate of the scale of undeclared labour as a 
percentage of total labour inputs in the private sector), GDP per capita is used (ILO, 2012; 
Yamada, 1996). Meanwhile, two indicators test the quality of government tenet of 
modernisation theory: the European Quality of Government index, and the Corruption 
Perceptions index. The neo-liberal theory that undeclared work is a result of high tax rates and 
state over-interference and conversely, the political economy theory that it is due to state under-
intervention in work and welfare, the indicators used are: the level of public expenditure on 
labour market interventions to protect vulnerable groups; the impact of social transfers in 
reducing poverty, and the implicit tax rate (ITR) on labour. See Table A1 in the Appendix for 
details of each indicator and the data sources. 
To analyse whether there is a statistically significant relationship between cross-
national variations in the magnitude of undeclared work and the economic and social conditions 
that each theory posits are associated, bivariate regression analysis is undertaken. Here, 
6SHDUPDQ¶VUDQNFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWUs) is used due to the non-parametric nature of the data 
to discover whether the statistically significant associations are strong and very strong (rs > 
0.7).  
  
4. Results: evaluating the competing theories 
 
In the EU, the finding is that 11.6% of total labour input in the private sector is undeclared 
work (see Figure 1), and undeclared work constitutes on average 16.4% of GVA in the private 
sector (see Figure 2). Interestingly, this latter figure is higher is because undeclared labour is 
found to be concentrated in sectors where labour productivity is higher.  
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However, these figures are unweighted averages, not accounting for the relative size of 
the labour force in each country (Eurostat, 2017). The weighted averages are 9.3% of total 
labour input in the private sector is undeclared work, and undeclared work constitutes 14.3% 
of GVA in the private sector. The weighted average is lower than the unweighted average due 
to the influence of larger countries such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom, which 
have larger labour forces and relatively lower levels of undeclared work.  
As Figure 1 displays, there are large differences in the magnitude of undeclared work 
between member states. The member states with undeclared economies larger than the EU 
average are largely new EU member states (NMS). Only Italy is included among the older 
members. Only the Czech Republic from the NMS has a smaller than EU average undeclared 
economy. The lowest share of undeclared work in terms of labour input is in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands where less than 3% of the total labour input is 
undeclared work. Alternative measures of undeclared work, capturing the informal 
employment or the shadow economy are available in Table 1. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As Figure 2 reveals, the distribution of countries does not significantly alter when undeclared 
work is analysed as a proportion of GVA in the private sector. Undeclared work is highest in 
Poland, Romania and Lithuania where it is greater than 25% of total GVA created in the private 
sector. Countries with undeclared economies larger than the EU average are again mostly new 
member states (Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia and Czech Republic) along 
with only three older EU members: Greece, Spain and Italy. Only Slovakia and Slovenia from 
the group of NMS countries have undeclared economies slightly below the EU average. It is to 
be noted, that even in the economy with the lowest share of undeclared work, namely Germany, 
it is still 7% of private sector GVA. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Not only the magnitude of undeclared work but also the character of undeclared work differs 
across EU member states. As Figure 3 reveals, in the EU, 61.8% of all undeclared work is 
conducted by employees, 37.3% by the self-employed and 0.3% by family workers (i.e. persons 
working in a family business or on a family farm without pay and who are living in the same 
household as the owner of the business or farm and receive remuneration in the form of fringe 
benefits or payments in kind). However, this varies across countries. 
In some countries, the undeclared economy is largely composed of undeclared self-
employment (e.g. Cyprus, Netherlands and Portugal) but this is not the case in others. In a 
significant number of countries, such as Bulgaria and Poland, it is much more an issue related 
to undeclared waged employment where employees are employed on either a wholly 
undeclared (i.e. unregistered) basis or are engaged in semi-declared employment (i.e. with a 
portion of their salary being paid as an undeclared envelope wage). Comparing Poland and 
Denmark for example, in Poland, 25.3% of dependent employment is undertaken in the 
undeclared economy (measured in terms of total labour inputs), but only 2.5% of self-
employment is in the undeclared economy, and 5.7% of the labour inputs of family workers 
are undeclared. The result is that 98% of all undeclared work is conducted by employees. In 
Denmark, in stark contrast, only 3.0% of dependent employment is conducted in the undeclared 
economy, but 58.9% of self-employment and 58.9% of family work. The result is that 71.5% 
of all undeclared work is conducted by the self-employed. Until now, no studies have sought 
to explain these cross-country differences in the character of undeclared work. However, they 
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are likely to be the product of national specificities, such as the structure of their labour market, 
and different national legislative contexts.    
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
These cross-country differences in the structure of the undeclared labour market across the EU 
have significant implications for tackling undeclared work. Policy initiatives to help business 
start-up declared, such as aiding entrepreneurs to make the transition from unemployment to 
self-employment, will be useful in Denmark (and other countries where most undeclared work 
is conducted by the self-employed) and less relevant in Poland and other countries where most 
undeclared work is conducted by employees. Meanwhile, policy initiatives to tackle 
unregistered or under-declared waged employment, such as the use of notification letters to 
change the behaviour of employers and employees, will be relevant in Poland and other 
countries where undeclared work is mostly undertaken by employees, but less relevant in 
Denmark and other countries where undeclared work is mostly conducted by the self-
employed. However, it is not only that policy measures need to be tailored to countries 
according to the character of their undeclared work.   
  
Explaining cross-national variations in undeclared work in the European Union  
 
Using the LIM data, an analysis can be undertaken of the relationship between cross-national 
variations in the magnitude of undeclared work and the economic and social characteristics 
that each theorisation views as determinants. Given the small sample size of 28 countries and 
lack of necessary controls to include in a multivariate regression analysis, it is only possible 
KHUH WR FRQGXFW ELYDULDWH UHJUHVVLRQ DQDO\VHV 7R GR WKLV 6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQN FRUUHODWLRQ
coefficient (rs) is used due to the non-parametric nature of the data. Despite the limitation of 
only using bivariate regression analysis, there are some meaningful findings regarding the 
validity of the different theoretical explanations.  
Previous studies, using direct survey data, reveal that undeclared work is higher in 
Member States with: lower levels of GDP per capita; less modern institutions of governance, 
displayed by higher levels of public sector corruption and lower qualities of governance; lower 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP on active labour market policies; lower levels of social 
expenditure; and less effective social transfer systems (Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams, 
2014a,b,c; 2015a,b; Williams and Horodnic, 2015, 2016, 2017; Williams and Kedir, 2018a,b,c; 
Williams and Krasniqi, 2018; Williams et al., 2015). Therefore, it is here tested whether similar 
finding result when using the indirect LIM.  
First, the validity of modernisation theory is evaluated, using the LIM estimate of the 
scale of undeclared work as a percentage of total labour inputs in the private sector. The finding 
is that there is a strong significant relationship between cross-national variations in the 
magnitude of undeclared work and cross-national variations in GDP per capita in purchasing 
power standards (rs=-.783***). The greater the level of GDP per capita in purchasing power, 
the smaller is the scale of undeclared work. As Figure 4 reveals, countries such as Bulgaria, 
Romania and Latvia with relatively low levels of GDP per capita have higher levels of 
undeclared work, whilst countries with relatively high levels of GDP per capita (such as 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland) have relatively lower levels of undeclared work. This 
confirms hypothesis H1a. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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There is also a strong significant correlation between cross-national variations in the level of 
undeclared work and cross-national variations in the quality of government as measured by the 
European Quality of Government Index (EQI). This index includes measures of both 
perceptions and experiences with public sector corruption, along with the extent to which 
citizens believe various public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality 
(Charron et al., 2015). As Figure 5 reveals, the higher is the quality of government, the lower 
is the level of undeclared work (rs= -.686 ***). Countries such as Romania and Bulgaria with 
low rankings on the European Quality of Government index have higher levels of undeclared 
work, whilst countries such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, with higher scores on this index, 
have relatively lower levels of undeclared work. This confirms hypothesis H1b.  
  
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Reinforcing this, there is a significant correlation between the magnitude of undeclared work 
and the SHUFHLYHGOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQDVPHDVXUHGE\7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶V&RUUXSWLRQ
Perceptions Index. This ranks each member state based on perceptions of public sector 
FRUUXSWLRQ$FRXQWU\¶s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a 
scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it 
is perceived as very clean1. The finding is that the higher is the perceived level of corruption, 
the higher is the level of undeclared work (rs=-.597***). This further confirms hypothesis H1b. 
Modernisation theory is therefore confirmed. The higher is the level of GDP per capita in 
purchasing power standards, the greater the quality of government and the lower is the 
perceived level of corruption, the lower is the magnitude of undeclared work.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Examining the validity of neo-liberal theory and political economy theory, the first 
finding is that the higher the active labour market policy expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) 
on labour market policy (LMP) interventions, covering the range of financial and practical 
supports offered by governments to people who are unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged 
in the labour market, the lower is the level of undeclared work (rs=-.507***). As Figure 7 
reveals, countries such as Romania, Lithuania and Latvia with relatively low levels of 
expenditure on labour market policy interventions targeting vulnerable groups, have larger 
undeclared economies. Meanwhile, countries such as Denmark and Spain with higher levels of 
such expenditure have a lower prevalence of undeclared work. This, therefore, confirms the 
political economy explanation that greater state intervention reduces undeclared work (H3) and 
refutes the neo-liberal explanation (H2b) that state over-interference in the free market 
increases the scale of undeclared work.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
This is further reinforced when examining the impact of social transfers on reducing poverty, 
with poverty defined as the proportion of people with an income below 60% of the national 
median income. The greater the impact of social transfers on reducing poverty in a member 
state, the lower is the level of undeclared work (rs= -.570***). As Figure 8 reveals, member 
states such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Greece where social transfers have a limited 
                                                          
1
 $FRXQWU\¶VUDQNLQGLFDWHVLWVSRVLWLRQUHODWLYHWRWKHRWKHUFRXQWULHVLQFOXGHGLQWKHLQGH[7KHLQGH[IRU
includes 177 countries. 
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impact on reducing poverty have higher levels of undeclared work than member states where 
social transfers have greater impact on reducing poverty, such as Ireland, Denmark and 
Finland. This therefore provides further evidence to confirm the political economy explanation 
that greater state intervention reduces undeclared work (H3) and refutes the neo-liberal 
explanation (H2b) that state over-interference in the free market increases the magnitude of 
undeclared work.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, although there are considerable variations in the tax burden on labour income across 
Member States, there is no significant association with the level of undeclared work (rs=-.142). 
Member States with low tax burdens on labour such as the UK, Portugal and Bulgaria have 
relatively low, medium and high levels of undeclared work, and Member States with high tax 
burdens on labour do not have higher levels of undeclared work. Indeed, although not 
statistically significant, the line of best fit is downwards suggesting that as the tax burden 
increases, the level of undeclared work decreases. As such, there is no evidence to support the 
neo-liberal hypotheses that the higher is the tax burden, the higher is the level of undeclared 
work (not confirming H2a).   
    
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
To explain cross-national variations in the magnitude of undeclared work, this paper has 
evaluated three theories that variously explain a higher prevalence of undeclared work to be 
driven by economic under-development and corruption (modernisation theory), state over-
interference (neo-liberal theory) or inadequate state intervention in work and welfare (political 
economy theory). Reporting estimates of the magnitude of undeclared work using the Labour 
Input Method (LIM), the finding is 9.3% of total labour input in the private sector in the EU is 
undeclared, and undeclared work constitutes 14.3% of GVA in the private sector. 
However, there are significant cross-national variations in the magnitude of undeclared 
work. Evaluating the validity of the competing explanations for these cross-national variations 
using bivariate regressions, the structural economic and social conditions that result in lower 
levels of undeclared work have been identified. This has revealed that undeclared work is lower 
in member states with higher levels of GDP per capita, with more modernised systems of 
government, lower levels of corruption, and in which social transfers are effective at reducing 
poverty, and there are higher levels of public expenditure on labour market interventions to 
protect vulnerable groups. In consequence, this confirms the tenets of the modernisation and 
political economy theories but finds no support for the tenets of neo-liberal theory.  
This reinforces earlier theoretical findings in relation to the European Union (Williams, 
2013; Williams and Windebank, 2015). However, all these previous studies at an EU level have 
used the same direct survey method and dataset, namely a Eurobarometer survey based on face-
to-face interviews. Until now, there has been no confirmation of whether the findings are 
similar when using indirect measurements and other datasets. This paper has confirmed that 
this is the case when the labour input method is used. It confirms the need for a synthesis of 
the tenets of modernisation and political economy theory when explaining cross-national 
variations in the magnitude of undeclared work in what can EHWHUPHGD³QHR-PRGHUQLVDWLRQ´
theory.  
These findings also have major policy implications. Besides the need for enforcement 
authorities, such as labour inspectorates, tax administrations and social insurance authorities, 
to find more effective measures for transforming undeclared work into declared work 
(Eurofound, 2013; ILO, 2015, 2017; Williams, 2017), this paper reveals that addressing 
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broader economic and social conditions associated with the overarching modernisation of 
economies, state bureaucracies and social protection are also important. In other words, it 
reveals that although enforcement authorities can perhaps deal with the effects of undeclared 
work, it is wider national governments that need to address the broader economic and social 
drivers that lead workers and businesses to operate in the undeclared economy.   
In conclusion, this paper has shown that the magnitude of undeclared work is lower in 
member states with higher levels of GDP per capita, with more modernised systems of 
government, lower levels of corruption, and in which social transfers are effective at reducing 
poverty, and there are higher levels of public expenditure on labour market interventions to 
protect vulnerable groups. If this paper encourages a further testing of these correlations using 
more refined multivariate regression analysis to evaluate whether the same relationships hold, 
as well as encourages the collection of data to allow this to happen, then a first intention of this 
paper will have been achieved. This type of data should be collected and collated from various 
currently disconnected databases (e.g., Eurostat, Transparency International, World Bank) and, 
for more robust results, should cover longitudinal analysis.  If this article also facilitates 
understanding of the importance of addressing wider economic and social conditions when 
tackling undeclared work, then its broader intention will have been also achieved. 
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Figure 1 Undeclared work in the private sector in the EU, 2013: % of total labour input 
Notes: Estimates for Malta are not provided due to the inadequacy of the data for this member 
state  
Source: derived from Williams et al. (2017) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Undeclared work in the private sector, 2013: % of total GVA 
 
Notes: Estimates for Malta are not provided due to deficiencies of data sources for this member 
state  
Source: derived from Williams et al. (2017) 
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Figure 3 Undeclared work in EU countries: by type of employment, 2013 
 
Source: derived from Williams et al. (2017) 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between undeclared work and GDP per capita, 2013  
 
Note: To avoid excessive influence, the GDP of Luxembourg was capped at 150 in the analyses 
presented here. It should be noted that using the original figure of 262, the correlation 
coefficient is the same 
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Source: own calculations based on data from Eurostat database 
Figure 5. Relationship between undeclared work and European Quality of Government 
Index, 2013 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Charron et al. (2015) 
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Figure 6. Relationship between undeclared work and Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index, 2013 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Transparency International  
 
Figure 7. Relationship between undeclared work and public expenditure on labour market, 
2013 
20 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from Eurostat database 
Figure 8. Relationship between undeclared work and impact of social transfers on reducing 
poverty, 2013 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from European Commission report Employment and 
Social Developments in Europe 2015 
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Table 1. Undeclared work in EU28: estimates by using differing approaches 
 
Undeclared work in the 
private sector 
Informal employment 
in total employment 
Shadow 
Economy 
 
% of total 
labour input 
% of total 
GVA % 
MIMIC 
estimates 
 
2013 2013 2012/2013* 2013 
Austria 8.7 10.0 10.0 8.7 
Belgium 11.9 15.4 13.5 18.8 
Bulgaria 17.8 19.2 15.9 22.4 
Croatia 14.2 17.1 13.0 25.3 
Cyprus 13.8 17.9 15.1 34.7 
Czech Republic 7.7 16.9 9.2 11.8 
Denmark 9.6 14.3 11.2 15.2 
Estonia 14.8 21.3 6.9 18.0 
Finland 9.3 11.8 6.3 13.1 
France 8.8 11.0 9.8 12.4 
Germany 4.4 7.1 10.2 9.2 
Greece 12.4 22.5 32.8 27.8 
Hungary 17.3 23.2 12.2 21.6 
Ireland 8.6 13.0 13.5 11.1 
Italy 12.9 17.2 19.0 24.5 
Latvia 18.3 22.3 13.2 16.7 
Lithuania 19.8 25.2 12.6 18.3 
Luxembourg 5.4 9.1 1.2 10.7 
Malta 
  
8.1 27.2 
Netherlands 5.2 11.9 9.4 8.4 
Poland 20.8 27.3 38.0 18.9 
Portugal 6.6 15.5 12.1 20.4 
Romania 18.9 26.2 28.9 24.0 
Slovakia 13.4 14.7 16.7 11.8 
Slovenia 13.2 16.4 5.0 23.0 
Spain 8.8 17.9 27.3 24.4 
Sweden 7.7 9.7 8.2 12.3 
United Kingdom 2.7 9.5 13.6 9.6 
Notes:* Harmonized data (ILO, 2018) latest available year: 2012; for Germany latest available year is 2013 
Sources: derived from Williams et al. (2017), ILO (2018), Medina and Schneider (2018) 
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Appendix 1 Data sources of the structural conditions  
 
Table A1. Indicators used and description 
Indicator/ 
Year 
Description 
GDP per capita 
in purchasing 
power 
standards/ 2013 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure for the economic activity. It is 
defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any 
goods or services used in their creation. The volume index of GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) is expressed in relation to the 
European Union (EU28) average set to equal 100. If the index of a country 
is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the 
EU average and vice versa. Basic figures are expressed in PPS, i.e. a 
common currency that eliminates the differences in price levels between 
countries allowing meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between 
countries. Please note that the index, calculated from PPS figures and 
expressed with respect to EU28 = 100, is intended for cross-country 
comparisons rather than for temporal comparisons.  
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en
&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1 
European 
Quality of 
Government 
Index/ 2013 
The European Quality of Government Index (EQI) is the result novel survey 
data on corruption and governance at the regional level within the EU, 
conducted in first in 2010 and then again in 2013. The data focus on both 
perceptions and experiences with public sector corruption, along with the 
extent to which citizens believe various public sector services are 
impartially allocated and of good quality. The data is standardized with a 
mean of zero, and higher scores implying higher quality of government. 
Available at: 
https://nicholascharron.wordpress.com/european-quality-of-government-
index-eqi/  
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index/ 2013 
The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on 
KRZFRUUXSWWKHLUSXEOLFVHFWRULVSHUFHLYHGWREH$FRXQWU\RUWHUULWRU\¶V
score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 
0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 
means it is perceived as very clean. A country's rank indicates its position 
relative to the other countries and territories included in the index. This 
year's index includes 177 countries and territories. 
Available at: 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results#myAnchor1  
Impact of social 
transfers on 
poverty 
reduction/2013 
Poverty defined as the proportion of people with an income below 60% of 
the national median income. 
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14951&langId=en  
Public 
expenditure on 
Labour market policy expenditure (% of GDP):  
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labour market 
interventions to 
protect 
vulnerable 
groups/ 2013 
Labour market policy (LMP) interventions cover the range of financial and 
practical supports offered by governments to people who are unemployed 
or otherwise disadvantaged in the labour market. 
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/labour-market/labour-market-
policy/database  
Implicit tax rate 
(ITR) on 
labour/ 2012 
Implicit tax rate on labour: approximates to the average effective tax burden 
RQODERXUDQGLVWKHVXPRIDOOGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWWD[HVDQGHPSOR\HHV¶DQG
HPSOR\HUV¶VRFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQVOHYLHGRQHPSOR\HGODERXULQFRPHGLYLded 
by the total compensation of employees. 
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en
&pcode=tec00119&plugin=1  
 
